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The past 50 years have seen a new innovation in British politics: the 
referendum. Although it seems odd from the perspective of 2019, prior 
to 1973 the UK had never held one. Needless to say, the referendum 
as a construct is therefore rather alien to the UK’s parliamentary 
democracy, in which politicians are elected in order to represent a 
particular area and its interests and legislate on behalf of those who 
elect them. 
It is interesting that every single one of these votes (bar one) have 
been on the same issues: the governance of constituent parts of the 
UK or the UK’s membership of the EU. Aside from the famous 1975 
referendum on membership of the European Communities, referenda 
also occurred on the unification of Ireland and devolution in Scotland 
and Wales. In all cases, the status quo ante was maintained (although 
Scotland in fact voted narrowly in favour of devolution, the result did 
not surpass the threshold set by the government of the day). It is 
noteworthy that had such a threshold been put in place prior to the EU 
referendum of 2016, the UK would not now be engaged in the process 
of leaving. 
The first referendum – in 1973 on the unification of Ireland – was 
constitutionally interesting but rather divisive, being effectively 
boycotted by the nationalist side. Nevertheless, whilst significant it 
effectively represented a development of existing British policy, 
certainly as far back as the Statute of Westminster 1931 and arguably 
as far as the 1921 Anglo-Irish treaty. In effect, it was an opportunity 
for the population of Northern Ireland to exercise a (probably already 
recognised) right[1] to self-determination, albeit within limited 
parameters[2]. 
It is certainly arguable that the Wilson referendum on continued 
membership of the EC in 1975 was of greater significance. In practical 
terms, withdrawing from the EC at that point would not have posed 
nearly the issues that leaving the EU does 40 years later. In part this 
is due to the fact that the UK had only just joined and was in the 
process of aligning with the rest of the EC. To a large extent, 
however, it simply represents the fact that the European Union (which 
replaced the European Communities) has evolved substantially over 
the prior 40 years[3]. 
In any event, the fact that the 1975 referendum was handily won 
tends to obscure the fundamental point that it established a 
precedent: the referendum was a valid tool in the UK’s parliamentary 
democracy and could be used to establish popular consent for major 
constitutional changes. In contrast, the use of referenda as devices by 
the Callaghan and Blair governments were interesting but did not 
fundamentally change the constitutional status quo ante. They were 
merely plebiscites on whether to establish regional assemblies (or, in 
the case of London, an elected mayor). 
Of course, this trend obscures two important facts: firstly that support 
for changed subnational governance in Wales and Scotland increased 
significantly through the Thatcher/Major years and secondly that their 
establishment was an implicit acknowledgement of the changing 
structure of the UK. The referenda of the Cameron governments 
opened a constitutional Pandora’s Box, which the UK is ill-equipped to 
deal with. The first – now long forgotten – referendum was on whether 
to alter the system used to elect MPs in the UK. The public voted to 
maintain the current plurality-based system by a large margin (albeit 
on a very low turnout). 
This should have immediately alerted us to the fact that something 
was amiss. Neither of the two systems proposed were particularly 
satisfactory, but the fact that only a minority of UK electors were 
interested enough in a fundamental part of the country’s democracy to 
bother to vote should have raised concerns. Indeed, of the two 
systems it seems likely that, more often than not, the (rejected) 
alternative would reflect true voter preferences somewhat better than 
the status quo. 
The second referendum – on Scottish independence – was, unlike the 
EU referendum, binding. Unlike the EU referendum, the franchise was 
extended to include both EU nationals and 16 & 17 year olds. 
Expanding the franchise in this way might have been understandable, 
but it then raises thorny questions for the EU referendum. Arbitrarily 
changing the franchise based on political convenience, expediency or 
perceived legitimacy is deeply problematic. 
However, irrespective of the result, the very fact of holding the 
referendum raises other concerns. Holding a referendum implicitly 
acknowledges the fact that Scotland has the right to self-
determination just as the Irish have. That Scotland chose not to 
exercise that right in 2014 does not change its existence. Thus, the 
UK is not a nation-state but rather a state made up of sovereign 
nations. That has quite powerful and important ramifications, for it 
implies that ultimately sovereignty does not lie with Westminster, as it 
hitherto has, but has rather been delegated to Westminster by the 
people of Scotland. 
Scotland presumably then has the right to withdraw that delegated 
sovereignty at any point. Presumably this would need to be done 
through the device of a referendum (and not simply via the request of 
Scottish MPs or MSPs), although as the UK has no written 
constitution nor any convention upon which to fall back on this is 
rather unclear. In any event, this drives something of a cart-and-
horses through the UK’s constitutional conventions. It also raises 
difficult questions over the appropriate level of representation for 
Scotland in the UK’s parliament: traditionally supra-national 
parliaments (as in the EU but is also practiced at a national level in 
the USA) give excessive weight to smaller members, in spite of the 
fact such practices are patently undemocratic when looking at the 
rights of individuals in the federation as a whole. 
This also raises the interesting question of whether Scotland (and/or 
Northern Ireland) should be permitted to unilaterally block Brexit. In 
any event, the difficult constitutional questions asked by the Scottish 
independence referendum could be ducked in the immediate 
aftermath, since the government of the day won the vote. The same 
was not true of the 2016 referendum on EU membership. As 
eloquently pointed out by A.C. Grayling, it is at a minimum highly 
debateable whether the outcome of the 2016 referendum could be 
termed ‘safe’[4]. The upshot of all of this is that the UK’s “unwritten 
constitution” is under pressure like never before and is probably no 
longer fit for purpose. 
As such, it is hardly surprising that the government finds itself at 
loggerheads with Parliament: a bizarre situation for a government that 
needs to have the confidence of a majority of MPs. Indeed, the 
Speaker of the House of Commons has had to make several 
interesting and controversial interpretations of parliamentary tradition 
in order to ensure that Parliament can remain an adequate check on 
the executive. There is no parliamentary majority for most courses of 
action, and an unwillingness to countenance leaving the EU without a 
Withdrawal Agreement because they believe that to do so would not 
be in the best interests of the UK (which is, in fact, their job) 
We are thus left with the bitter irony that the rallying cry of Brexiters – 
the desire to “take back control” to Westminster – can only be 
achieved by wresting control away from Westminster, potentially 
killing parliamentary democracy in the process. What we are left with 
is a bizarre hybrid between some form of direct democracy (hence the 
recourse to referenda), demagogy (with threats to dissolve parliament, 
under the guise of implementing the will expressed in a direct vote, 
which asked a different but related question) and the representative 
democracy that the UK has hitherto been. 
What the final outcome of this ongoing toxic mess will be, I cannot 
say. However, it is rapidly becoming clear that there need to be clear 
constitutional safeguards in place and that we need to formalise the 
appropriate role of plebiscites, including when they should and when 
they should not be held and what valid questions must look 
like.  Further down the line, there will need to be proper clarification on 
territorial issues, which I hope to address in a future blog. 
[1] Whilst it’s certainly arguable (per the interpretation of the Irish Free 
State) that the 1921 treaty itself gave Ireland the right to self-
determination. If we accept this interpretation then the same treaty 
and granted the North specific rights in this regard in terms of 
choosing which state to be part of. If not, then the UK government 
only fully recognised the right of self-determination for Ireland with the 
passing of the Statute of Westminster 1931. Since by this time, 
Northern Ireland was firmly part of the UK and not the Irish Free State, 
the 1973 referendum could be argued to be weakly innovative. This 
notwithstanding, since Ireland was de facto a completely independent 
state from 1921 (and not 1931) this would all appear to be something 
of a technicality. 
[2] The limitation being the fact that the referendum, as in 1921, 
merely gave the choice between being a part of one country – Ireland 
– and another. 
[3] Indeed, whilst for many Eurosceptics this is precisely why they 
seek to leave, it is ironic that it is UK governments – who we as voters 
have returned to power again and again – that have been in the 
vanguard of many of these developments. It was the Thatcher 
government that pushed for the establishment of the Single Market in 
the late 1980s and the Thatcher government that entered the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The UK (alongside France) was a 
driving force behind the creation of the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA), providing a significant proportion of technical 
expertise. 
Likewise, the UK has been hugely supportive of Open Skies within 
Europe, which has allowed the flourishing of low-cost aviation within 
the EU. The UK is the major beneficiary of huge chunks of the audio-
visual media services directive, due to the role played by the English 
language. The Blair government – elected in the UK by a huge 
majority – pushed hard for the inclusion of new Eastern European 
member states and immediately adopted a vastly more liberal 
approach to migration than most of the rest of Western Europe 
(alongside Ireland and Sweden). The government then handily won 
the next election in 2005. It is difficult to argue that the UK populace 
have not had their say in the EU. 
[4] A. C. Grayling (2019). ‘Brexit and the Question of the UK 
Constitution’, in Alex de Ruyter & Beverley Nielsen (ed.) Brexit 
Negotiations After Article 50: Assessing Process, Progress and 
Impact (Brexit Studies Series). Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 15-29 
 
